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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
ORVILLE K. WROLSTAD,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Court of Appeals
Case No. 890052CA

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, INTERSTATE ELECTRIC
COMPANY and/or HOME INSURANCE/
HOME INDEMNITY,

Category No. 6

RESPONDENTS.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER ORVILLE K. WROLSTAD

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review
an order of the Utah State Industrial Commission pursuant to
Section 35-1-86, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a petition for review of an order of the
Industrial Commission of Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues presented for review on appeal are as
follows:
1.

Does the statute of repose found in the Utah

Occupational Disease Disability Law offend the "open courts"
provision of the Utah Constitution by failing to provide an
effective and reasonable remedy to an injured worker?

2.

Does the Occupational Disease Disability Law impose

a statute of repose arbitrarily to the claims of victims of
certain occupational diseases in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Utah Constitution?
DETERMINITIVE PROVISIONS
Article 1, Section 11, Utah Constitution [Courts Open Redress of Injuries]:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause
to which he is a party."
Article 1, Section 24, Utah Constitution [Uniform
Operation of Laws]:
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation*"
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-2-13(a), Employer Liability for
Compensation - Conditions when no payment to be made:
(a) There is imposed upon every employer a
liability for the payment of compensation to every
employee who becomes totally disabled by reason of
an occupational disease subject to the following
conditions:
(1) No compensation shall be paid when
the last day of injurious exposure of the
employee to the hazards of said occupational
diseases shall have occurred prior to the
effective date of this act.
(2) No compensation shall be paid for a
disease other than silicosis unless total
disability results within one year from the
last day upon which the employee actually

worked for the employer against whom compensation is claimed/ provided, that an employee
whose disablement or death was due to occupational exposure to ionizing radiation, a claim
for such compensation shall (notwithstanding
the provisions of Section 35-1-48) be filed
within one year after the date upon which the
employee first suffered incapacity from the
exposure to radiation and either knew or in
the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have known that the occupational disease was
caused by his present or prior employment*
(3) No compensation shall be paid in
case of silicosis unless during the fifteen
years immediately preceding the disablement,
the injured employee shall have been exposed
to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide
(Si02) dust for a total period of not less
than five years in this state and unless total
disability results within (a) three years in
case of silicosis not complicated by active
tuberculosis, or (b) five years in case of
silicosis complicated by active tuberculosis,
from the last day upon which the employee
actually worked for the employer against whom
compensation is claimed*
(4) No claim shall be maintained nor
compensation paid unless the claim has been
filed with the commission in writing within
the time fixed by the appropriate subdivision
of Section 35-1-48.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about February 23, 1988, Orville K. Wrolstad
filed an occupational disease claim with the Utah State
Industrial Commission.

Mr. Wrolstad claimed that he suffered

from the occupational disease of pleural asbestosis as a
result of his exposure to asbestos in the course of his
employment with Interstate Electric Company.

A Motion to

Dismiss was filed by the respondents in which it was asserted

that the claim was barred by the Section 35-2-13(a), Utah Code
Ann,

The Motion to Dismiss was granted by Judge Timothy C.

Allen on the 1st day of September 1988. A Motion for Review
was filed by the applicant.

The Industrial Commission of Utah

denied this Motion by Order dated January 23, 1989. A petition to the Utah Court of Appeals was taken.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Orville K. Wrolstad, a resident of Phoenix, Arizona,

was employed by Interstate Electric Company for a period of 18
months within the state of Utah. (R.13)
2.

Mr. Wrolstad*s employment with Interstate Electric

Company occurred during the years 1976 to 1977. (R.36,41)
3«

Mr. Wrolstad claimed that during his employment with

Interstate Electric Company, he was exposed to asbestos. (R*l)
4.

On February 5, 1987, Orville Wrolstad was diagnosed

as suffering from pleural asbestosis. (R.9)
5.

The applicant claims to have been exposed to

asbestos while employed in the state of Arizona in 196 2, while
employed in the state of North Dakota in 1962, 1963, 1964,
1966, and 1968, and while employed in South Dakota in 1961 and
1968. (R.38, 38, 44, 45 and 46)
6.

The applicant filed a first report of injury with

the Utah State Industrial Commission on or about March 30,
1987 wherein he claimed that he suffered from asbestosis and
that the last injurious exposure to asbestos occurred while

employed in Utah with Interstate Electric Company. (R.l)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The statute of repose found in the Utah occupational
disease law offends the "open courts" provision of the Utah
Constitution*

To survive a constitutional attack, legislative

enactments which modify the rights of injured parties must
provide an effective and reasonable alternative remedy or must
employ reasonable means to eliminate a clear social or
economic evil.

The short statute of repose found in the Utah

occupational disease law unreasonably denies victims of
asbestosis a just and fair remedy for their injury.
The Utah occupational disease law singles out
victims of radiation exposure and excepts them from the one
year statute of repose.

By treating disabled workers dif-

ferently when the cause of the disability is radiation
exposure, the occupational disease law offends the equal
protection clause of the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN THE UTAH OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE DISABILITY LAW VIOLATES THE OPEN
COURTS PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Mr. Wrolstad, born in 1923, has worked throughout
his life as a union electrician.

Shortly before Mr. Wrolstad

reached retirement age, he was diagnosed as suffering from
asbestosis.

Mr. Wrolstad filed occupational disease claims in

several states where he believed he was exposed to asbestos*
Mr. Wrolstad has alleged in his occupational disease claim
that he was exposed to injurious levels of asbestos when
employed with Interstate Electric in the state of Utah in 1976
and 1977. Mr. Wrolstad terminated his employment with Interstate Electric in 1977.
Asbestosis is a form of lung disease caused by the
inhalation of asbestos dust.

Asbestos is a generic term used

to describe a number of naturally occurring fibrous, hydrated
mineral silicates.

As with other forms of lung disease, there

is a latency period or lag time in the development of asbestos
related health effects.

It is believed that the latency

period between asbestos exposure and diagnosis of a disease is
between fifteen and forty years and varies within diseases.
See Asbestos Associated Diseases, Science, Public Policy and
Litigation, Dr. Hans Weill, "Chest", November 1983.
The Utah Supreme Court in its consideration of the
constitutionality of the Products Liability Act noted that
"chemicals such as asbestos and vinyl chloride, can cause
disease and death many years after exposure."

Berry v. Beech

Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah 1985).
When the Utah Legislature adopted an occupational
disease law, it abolished the common law right of an employee
to maintain an action against an employer for disease or
injuries to health sustained by an employee which arise out of

or in the course of his employment.

This common law right was

replaced with an administrative procedure which was designed
to provide disabled employees with an efficiently administered
remedy.

Masich v. United States Smelting; Refining and Mining

Co., 191 P.2d 612 (Utah 1948).
The occupational disease law adopted by the Utah
Legislature imposes liability for asbestosis on the worker's
last employer in whose employment the worker was injuriously
exposed to the hazards of asbestos.
Code Ann.

Section 35-2-14, Utah

All prior employers of the worker are immune from

liability regardless of the exposure.

The occupational

disease law contained its own statute of limitations.

A claim

for asbestosis must be filed within one year after the cause
of action arises.

The cause of action is deemed to arise "on

the date the employee first suffered incapacity from the
occupational disease and knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that the occupational
disease was caused by his employment."

Section 35-2-49, Utah

Code Ann.
In addition to a statute of limitations, the Utah
occupational disease law contains a statute of repose. A
statute of repose is a time bar to a cause of action that runs
from an occurrence of an event other than the occurrence of
the injury that gives rise to the cause of action.

The

statute of repose found in the occupational disease law runs

from the date on which a worker terminates his employment with
a particular employer.

In the case of asbestosis, a worker is

barred from maintaining an occupational disease claim unless
he becomes totally disabled within one year from the date the
worker was last employed by the employer against whom compensation is claimed.

Section 35-2-13(a)(2), Utah Code Ann.

In passing the statute of repose, the Utah
Legislature recognized that occupational diseases caused by
ionizing radiation have a long incubation period and afforded
workers suffering from this disease a statute of repose that
is identical to the statute of limitations for occupational
diseases.
In light of the latency period of asbestosis, the
statute of repose found in the occupational disease law
effectively denies many workers suffering from this disease a
remedy.

See Tisco Intermountain v. Industrial Commission of

Utah, 744 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987).
Mr. Wrolstad contends that the statute of repose
found in the Occupational Disease Disability Law offends the
"open courts" provision of the Utah Constitution.
courts provision provides, in part, that:

The open

"Every person, for

an injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law . . . ."

This consti-

tutional provision has been construed to impose limitations on
a legislature when it passes laws which modify the rights of

those persons who have been injured in their person, property
or reputation•
Balancing the "open courts" provision with the
necessary legislative prerogative to pass laws that promote
the public health, safety, morals and welfare, the Utah
Supreme Court adopted a two part analysis to be used in
scrutinizing a legislative enactment to determine whether it
offends the "open courts" provision.
"First, Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides
an injured person an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy 'by due course of law1 for
vindication of his constitutional interest• The
benefit provided by this substitute must be substantially equal in value or other benefit to the
remedy abrogated in providing essentially comparable substantive protection to one's person,
property or reputation, although the form of the
substantive remedy may be different. . . .
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause
of action may be justified only if there is a clear
social or economic evil to be eliminated and the
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an
arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the
objective." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 717 P.2d
at 680.

The intent, purposes and objectives of the Utah
Occupational Disease Disability Act are similar to those of
the Worker's Compensation Act. Masich v. United States
Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., supra.

Both are designed

to eleviate hardship upon workers and their families when disabling work-related injuries occur.

Baker v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965).

The Utah

Supreme Court has held that the Workers Compensation Act
should be liberally construed to afford coverage to an
employee during a time of need.

Produce v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 652 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1983).
The statute of repose found in the Utah occupational
disease law serves to defeat the purpose of the law rather
than to further its purpose.
The Utah Products Liability Act was found to be
arbitrary and unreasonable in part because the statute of
repose did not consider the useful life of the product.
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., supra.

Berry

Similarly, in this case, with

the exception of silicosis and diseases caused by radiation
exposure, the Act applies to all other diseases, irrespective
of whether the disease has a long latency period following the
injurious exposure.

The occupational disease law has failed

to keep pace with advances in medicine which have resulted in
a greater understanding of certain occupational diseases.
The statute of repose found in the Utah Occupational
Disease Law fails to satisfy the two part analysis set forth
by the Utah Supreme Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
supra.

This short statute of repose effectively denies many

victims of asbestosis an adequate remedy as their cause of
action is barred before they become disabled as a result of
the disease.

Secondly, this short statute of repose is

inconsistent with the purpose of the law which is to provide

an adequate remedy for workers who contract an occupational
disease in the course of their employment.

Accordingly, this

court should find Section 35-2-13(a)(2) to be unconstitutional.
Section 35-2-13(a)(2) is severable from the balance
of the Act.
"Severability, where part of an Act is unconstitutional, is primarily a matter of legislative
intent . . . which generally is determined by
whether the remaining portions of the Act can stand
alone and serve a legitimate legislative purpose."
Berry v. Beech Aircraft, supra, at 686.
By striking the statute of repose from the Occupational
Disease Law, the balance of the legislation provides workers a
compensable scheme designed to assist workers in a time of
need.

The legislation has a relatively short limitation

period of one year which will protect employers from stale
claims.
POINT II
THE STATUTE OF REPOSE FOUND IN THE OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE DISABILITY LAW VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION
STANDARDS FOUND IN THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The principal of egual protection is set forth in
Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution:

"All laws of

a general nature shall have uniform operation."

The Utah

Supreme Court has held that although dissimilar, this language
embodies the same principal as the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.

It embraces the notion that

"persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and

persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if
their circumstances were the same."

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d

661 at 669 (Utah 1984)•
In assessing whether a statute meets equal protection standards, a court must consider the objectives of the
statute and whether the classifications contained therein
provide a reasonable basis for promoting these objectives*
"When persons are similarly situated, it is
unconstitutional to single out one person or group
of persons from among a larger class on the basis
of a tenuous justification that has little or no
merit." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).
The Utah Supreme Court has held the Utah Guest Statute
unconstitutional as incapable of reasonably furthering its
statutory objectives.
The Utah Occupational Disease Law unlawfully discriminates between victims of uranium exposure and victims of
asbestos.

The law recognizes the latency period for lung

cancer and other diseases caused by radiation exposure and
therefore excepts victims of radiation exposure from the
statute of repose.

However, workers who inhale asbestos dust

and contract asbestosis are not similarly treated.

They are

subject to a short statute of repose which prevents recovery
against an employer if more than one year has elapsed since
the worker has terminated his employment.

No reasonable basis

exists for allowing disabled workers to avoid the statute of
repose if they suffer from lung cancer caused by radiation

exposure but subjecting them to a short statute of repose if
they suffer lung cancer caused by the inhalation of asbestos
dust.

In both cases, the diseases commonly occur years after

the intitial exposure.
The Legislature has adopted an occupational disease
law to provide an expedient remedy for victims of occupational
diseases.

Victims of radiation exposure have been singled out

and excepted from the statute's short statute of repose.
Undoubtedly, the Legislature recognized the need to except
victims of radiation exposure from the effect of the law's
statute of repose due to the latency period between the initial exposure to radiation and the presence of the disease.
Yet, other diseases with latency periods are not treated similarly but subjected to a short statute of repose which often
results in the denial of benefits for a worker who becomes
totally disabled as a result of a injurious exposure on his
job.
Accordingly, this court should find the statute of
repose in violation of the egual protection standards of the
Utah Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner reguests that the court find the statute
of repose found in the Utah Occupational Disease Disability
Law unconstitutional and sever it from the balance of the law.

DATED this

1(5

day of April, 1989.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

By

^Marnti-bJzmACth./v£
William W. Downes, Jr.
Attorneys for Petitioner/
Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that

^

true and correct copies

of the foregoing instrument were mailed, postage prepaid, on
the 1Q

day of April, 1989 to the following counsel of

record:
Theodore E. Kanell
HANSEN, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C*
Attorneys for Respondents
Interstate Electric Company
and Home Insurance/Home
Indemnity
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Post Office Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
Post Office Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit A:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order of Administrative Law Judge dated
September 1, 1988.

Exhibit B:

Order Denying Motion for Review dated
January 23, 1989.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 38000191

ORVILLE WROLSTAD,

*
*

Applicant,
vs.
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC and/or
HOME INSURANCE/HOME INDEMNITY
Defendants.

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*
*
*
*

AND ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

PRE-HEARING
CONFERENCE:

Hearing Room 334, I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, S a l t Lake City, Utah, on August 30,
1988 at 2:00 p.m. o ' c l o c k .
Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Coxnmission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. A l l e n , Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was represented
J r . , Attorney at Law.

by William K. Downes,

The defendants were represented by Theodore Kanell,
Attorney at Law.
The defendants, by and through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the
application in this matter, on the grounds that the statute of limitations had
run. Thereafter, the Administrative Law Judge referred the matter to the
hearing clerk for the scheduling of a pre-trial hearing. Having had the
benefit of legal argument, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared to enter
the following

FINDINGS OF FACT:
Orville K. Wrolstad filed an occupational disease claim with the
Industrial Commission of Utah on February 25, 1988, alleging that he has
contracted the occupational disease of pleural asbestosis as the result of his
employment with Interstate Electric for the period 1977 to 1978. The
defendants, by and through counsel, made a motion to dismiss the application
on the grounds that the applicant's claim was not timely filed, in that the
defendants feel that the applicant knew or should have known by February 5,
1987, that his condition was work related, and accordingly his claim should
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have been filed no later than February 8, 1988. The applicant, contends that
he filed a claim on June 18, 1987, when he submitted an employer's first
report completed by himself and a report from Dr. Kilburn indicating that he
had asbestosis. The Administrative Law Judge would concur that for the notice
requirement, that the applicant's filing of June 18, 1987, would satisfy the
statute of limitations requirement.
However, the defendants raise an additional defense, namely that
contained in Section 35-2-13 of the Occupational Disease Act. Section 13
provides: "No compensation shall be paid for a disease other than silicosis
unless total disability results within one year from the last day upon which
the employee actually worked for the employer against whom compensation is
claimed; . . , ." The applicant's answers to interrogatories indicates that
he last worked for Interstate Electric in 1976.
Accordingly, for the
applicant's claim to have been timely, it should have been filed no later than
1977. Therefore, while it gives the Administrative Law Judge no pleasure to
deny the applicant's occupational disease claim, I am bound to follow the
express statutory provisions of the law.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the occupational disease claim of
Orville Wrolstad against Interstate Electric should be, and the same is hereby
dismissed with prejudice, for failure to comply with the statute of
limitations contained in Section 35-2-13, Utah Code Annotated.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on September / , 1988 a copy of the attached
ORDER in the case of Orville Wrolstad issued September 2
was mailed to the
following persons at the following addressest postage paid:
Orville K. Wrolstad
2423 East Aster Drive
Phoenix, A2 85032
William X. Downes, Jr.
Attorney at Law
175 West 200 South #4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Home Insurance
6000 Greenwood Plaza Blvd
Greenwood Village, Colo 80111
Attn: Pamela Morrison
Theodore Kanell
Attorney at Law
175 South West Temple #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By
Sherry

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 88000191

ORVILLS WROLSTAD,
Applicant,
vs.

*
*

ORDER DENYING

*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

INTERSTATE ELECTRIC and/or
HOME INSURANCE/
HOME INDEMNITY,

*
*
*
*

Defendants.

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On September 1, 1988, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dismissing
the Occupational Disease claim of the applicant in the above-referenced case.
The applicant's claim was for medical expenses and compensation related to his
pleural asbestosis, which the applicant claimed developed as a result of his
exposure to asbestos during his employment with the defendant in 19 77 and
1978. Prior to the issuance of the Order dismissing the applicant's claim,
the Administrative Law Judge held a conference with the attorneys for the
applicant and the defendant in which the issues raised by the defendant's
August 5, 1988 Motion to Dismiss were discussed. In that Motion to Dismiss,
the defendant argued that the applicant's claim failed due to his untimely
filing of the claim. The defendant cited U. C. A. 35-2-48, which requires
filing within one (1) year from the date the employee becomes aware of the
occupational origin of the disease involved. In his Order issued two days
after the conference, the Administrative Law Judge states that the applicant
had, in fact, filed within the time limit specified in U. C. A. 35-2-48.
However, the Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant's claim failed
because he did not become totally disabled from the asbestosis within one (1)
year from the date he last worked for the defendant as required by U. C. A.
35-2-13.
For failure to mee-fc the requirements of U. C. A. 35-2-13, the
Administrative Law Judge dismissed the applicant's Occupational Disease claim.
On September 26, 1988, pursuant to U. C. A. 35-1-82.53, counsel for
the applicant filed a Motion for Review. In that Motion for Review, counsel
for the applicant argues that the Commission should sever U. C. A. 35-2-13
from the Occupational Disease Act and decline to apply it in this case as it
is unconstitutional. Referring to U. C. A. 35-2-13 as a "statute of repose'*,
counsel for the applicant finds that the provision is violative of both the
equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution and the "open courts'* clause
of the Utah Constitution.
With respect to the equal protection clause,
counsel for the applicant states that U. C. A. 35-2-13 provides an exception

ORVILLE WRQLSTAD
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to the total-disability-within-one-year requirement for diseases caused by
radiation exposure (presumably due to the known latency period involved with
those diseases) but does not similarly provide an exception for diseases
caused by asbestos exposure (also typically involving lengthy latency
periods).
Counsel for the applicant finds that the U. C. A, 35-2-13
dissimilar treatment of individuals with similar diseases results in the
provision being in violation of the equal protection clause of the Utah
Constitution.
With respect to the -open courts" clause, counsel for the
applicant notes that U. C. A. 35-2-13 in combination with U. C. A. 35-2-3
(which states that the benefits specified in the Occupational Disease Act are
the sole remedy against an employer for a disease caused by the employment),
prevents the employee with occupational asbestosis from any recovery. Counsel
for the applicant maintains that this statutory bar to recovery makes U. C. A.
35-2-13 violative of the "open courts" clause of the Utah Constitution.
On October 6, 1988, counsel for the defendant filed a Response to the
applicant's Motion for Review. In the Response, counsel for the defendant
cites Masich v. U. S. Smelting. Refining & Mining Company, 191 P.2d 612 (Utah
1948).
From that case, counsel for the defendant quotes the Court's
determination that the Occupational Disease Act is constitutional not
withstanding the fact that the Act requires total disability in order for an
employee with an occupational disease to be entitled to benefits and also bars
the employee from a common law civil remedy. Counsel for the defendant also
cites case law from other jurisdictions concluding that statutory bars to
remedy for asbestosis are constitutional.
The Commission finds that the only issue on review is the
constitutionality of U. C. A. 35-2-13. The Commission adopts the Findings of
Fact as stated in the Administrative Law Judge's September 1, 1988 Order. The
Commission finds it is unfortunate that the Occupational Disease Act has not
been updated to correlate with medical advances that have linked latent
diseases like asbestosis with occupational exposure.
Although the law
presumably needs revision to better deal with diseases like asbestosis, the
case law cited by counsel for the defendant suggests that the current law is
constitutional. In addition, the Commission notes that the Utah Supreme Court
reversed the Commission's awaffd*of benefits to an applicant whose husband had
died as a result of asbestos exposure because the Court found that the
Industrial Commission did not correctly apply the U. C. A. 35-2-13 bar to
remedy. Tisco Intermountain vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 744 p.2d 1340
(Utah 1987).
Faced with the precedent cited above (Tisco and the Masich
cases), the Commission finds it must affirm the Administrative Law Judge's
denial of benefits.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's September 26, 1988
Motion for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's September 1,
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1988 Order is hereby affirmed and final with appeal to the Court of Appeals
within thirty (30) days of the final agency action as specified in U. C. A.
63-46b-12 through U. C. A. 63-46b-14 and U. C. A. 35-1-86.

^ P U l l i i l *\
Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

^miu.Mih
Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
sffi^
day of January, 1989.

J.
Sttptburz
Commissiotv>2Jecretary
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